This study of problems of governance in Pakistan 
which we bring with great pleasure to the attention of policy 
makers and concerned citizens of South Asia, and particularly 
those in Pakistan, is part of a major project of Centre for 
Policy Research (CPR) attempting a comprehensive 
multidisciplinary study of Problems of Governance in South 
Asian countries. The four other volumes in the series are on 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

PAKISTAN PROBLEMS of GOVERNANCE

Mushahid Hussain

The available literature on the nature of state power in 

Pakistan has essentially examined how the state apparatus 

came to predominate over the political system.1

state apparatus, the bureaucracy and the military have so far 

been lumped ‘ as co-sharers of the piece of the power cake 

that has accrued to the ‘state apparatus’ as opposed to the 

political elites in the civil society. The dynamics between the 

bureaucracy and the arm, and the changing internal balance of 

power within the state structure itself have hitherto not been 

analyzed. It would be useful to examine these dynamics, since 

the bureaucracy and the military are two quite different 

institutions. They not only relate in differing ways to the civil 

society, but in fact, it can be argued, have moved in opposing 

directions in terms of the nature of internal changes within 

these two institutions of the state respectively. 

 This chapter is an attempt at examining the changing 

balance of power between the bureaucracy and military within 

the state structure. In Section I, we examine the nature of the 

crisis that any authority purporting to govern has to confront. 

In Section II, the intra-institutional changes, as well as the 

inter-institutional changes with respect to the bureaucracy and 

military respectively are analyzed. Finally, in Section III the 

role of the people is examined, as a factor influencing the 

power structure, in a situation where institutions in the civil 

The ruling elite at the dawn of independence consisted of an 

alliance between landlords and the nascent industrial 

bourgeoisie, backed by the military and the bureaucracy. The 

nature of the ruling elite conditioned the nature of the 

economic growth process. However, the latter, in turn, 

influenced the form in which state power was exercised. 

Economic growth was of a kind that brought affluence to the 

few at the expense of the many. The gradual erosion of social 

infrastructure, endemic poverty and the growing inequality 

between the regions undermined the civil society and 

accelerated the trend towards militarization. 

 In this section we will examine the relationship 

between an increasingly militarist state structure, and the 

1. Economic Growth and Social Polarization 

 While the average annual growth rate of GNP fluctuated 

during the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Zia-ulHaq and Benazir Bhutto, the overall trend of growing poverty 

and social and regional inequality continued. 

 During the Ayub period (1960-1969) the basic objective 

of the development strategy was to achieve a high growth rate of 

GNP within the framework of private enterprise supported by 

government subsidies, tax concessions and import controls.1

Investment targets were expected to be achieved on the basis of 

the doctrine of functional inequality. This meant a deliberate 

transfer of in come from the poorer sections of society who were 

thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to high income 

groups who were expected to have a high marginal rate of 

savings. It was thought that by thus concentrating incomes in the 

hands of the rich, total domestic savings and hence investment 

 During the decade of the sixties when the above 

strategy was put into practice, while income was 

transferred into the hands of the rich, they failed to 

significantly increase their savings, thereby obliging the 

government to increase its reliance on foreign aid in order to meet its ambitious growth targets. The particular 

growth process in Pakistan during this period generated four 

 1. A dependent economic structure and growing inflow 

of foreign loans. (They increased from US $ 373 million 

between 1950-55 to US $ 2701 million i 1965.70.)2

 2. An acute concentration of economic power (43 

families represented 76.8 per cent of all manufacturing assets 

 3. The polarization of classes in the rural sector and a 

incomes of the rural elite increased sharply following the 

“Green Revolution” the real incomes of the rural poor 

declined in absolute terms. The per capita consumption of 

food grains of the poorest 65 per cent of Pakistan’s rural 

population fell from an index of 100 in 1963 to 91 in 1969.5

Similarly, according to a field survey, 33 per cent of small 

farmers operating less than 8 acres suffered a deterioration in 

their diet. During the 1960s as many as 794,042 small farmers 

 4. A growing economic disparity between the regions 

 These consequences of the economic growth process 

during the Ayub period generated explosive political tensions 

which not only overthrew the Ayub government bringing in 

Yahya Khan’s martial law, but also fuelled the secessionist 

movement in East Pakistan which ultimately resulted in the 

During the Bhutto period economic growth slowed 

down sharply. Industrial growth fell from an average of 13 per 

cent during 1960 to only 3 per cent during the period 1972 to 

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