Baskadia

PAKISTAN PROBLEMS of GOVERNANCE

CHAPTER-1

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER:

MILITARY, BUREAUCRACY AND THE

PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

The available literature on the nature of state power in

Pakistan has essentially examined how the state apparatus

came to predominate over the political system.1

Within the

state apparatus, the bureaucracy and the military have so far

been lumped ‘ as co-sharers of the piece of the power cake

that has accrued to the ‘state apparatus’ as opposed to the

political elites in the civil society. The dynamics between the

bureaucracy and the arm, and the changing internal balance of

power within the state structure itself have hitherto not been

analyzed. It would be useful to examine these dynamics, since

the bureaucracy and the military are two quite different

institutions. They not only relate in differing ways to the civil

society, but in fact, it can be argued, have moved in opposing

directions in terms of the nature of internal changes within

these two institutions of the state respectively.

This chapter is an attempt at examining the changing

balance of power between the bureaucracy and military within

the state structure. In Section I, we examine the nature of the

crisis that any authority purporting to govern has to confront.

In Section II, the intra-institutional changes, as well as the

inter-institutional changes with respect to the bureaucracy and

military respectively are analyzed. Finally, in Section III the

role of the people is examined, as a factor influencing the

power structure, in a situation where institutions in the civil

society have eroded.

2.ECONOMIC GROWTH. SOCIAL POLARIZATION

AND STATE POWER

The ruling elite at the dawn of independence consisted of an

alliance between landlords and the nascent industrial

bourgeoisie, backed by the military and the bureaucracy. The

nature of the ruling elite conditioned the nature of the

economic growth process. However, the latter, in turn,

influenced the form in which state power was exercised.

Economic growth was of a kind that brought affluence to the

few at the expense of the many. The gradual erosion of social

infrastructure, endemic poverty and the growing inequality

between the regions undermined the civil society and

accelerated the trend towards militarization.

In this section we will examine the relationship

between an increasingly militarist state structure, and the

nature of economic growth.

1. Economic Growth and Social Polarization

While the average annual growth rate of GNP fluctuated

during the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Zia-ulHaq and Benazir Bhutto, the overall trend of growing poverty

and social and regional inequality continued.

During the Ayub period (1960-1969) the basic objective

of the development strategy was to achieve a high growth rate of

GNP within the framework of private enterprise supported by

government subsidies, tax concessions and import controls.1

Investment targets were expected to be achieved on the basis of

the doctrine of functional inequality. This meant a deliberate

transfer of in come from the poorer sections of society who were

thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to high income

groups who were expected to have a high marginal rate of

savings. It was thought that by thus concentrating incomes in the

hands of the rich, total domestic savings and hence investment

could be raised.

During the decade of the sixties when the above

strategy was put into practice, while income was

transferred into the hands of the rich, they failed to

significantly increase their savings, thereby obliging the

government to increase its reliance on foreign aid in order to meet its ambitious growth targets. The particular

growth process in Pakistan during this period generated four

fundamental contradictions:

1. A dependent economic structure and growing inflow

of foreign loans. (They increased from US $ 373 million

between 1950-55 to US $ 2701 million i 1965.70.)2

2. An acute concentration of economic power (43

families represented 76.8 per cent of all manufacturing assets

by the end of the 1960s). 3

3. The polarization of classes in the rural sector and a

rapid increase in landlessness.4

For example, while the

incomes of the rural elite increased sharply following the

“Green Revolution” the real incomes of the rural poor

declined in absolute terms. The per capita consumption of

food grains of the poorest 65 per cent of Pakistan’s rural

population fell from an index of 100 in 1963 to 91 in 1969.5

Similarly, according to a field survey, 33 per cent of small

farmers operating less than 8 acres suffered a deterioration in

their diet. During the 1960s as many as 794,042 small farmers

became landless labourers.6

4. A growing economic disparity between the regions

of Pakistan.7

These consequences of the economic growth process

during the Ayub period generated explosive political tensions

which not only overthrew the Ayub government bringing in

Yahya Khan’s martial law, but also fuelled the secessionist

movement in East Pakistan which ultimately resulted in the

formation of Bangladesh.

During the Bhutto period economic growth slowed

down sharply. Industrial growth fell from an average of 13 per

cent during 1960 to only 3 per cent during the period 1972 to

1977. Similarly, the agricultural growth declined from an

average 6.65 per cent in the l960s to a mere 0.45 per cent in

the period 1970 to l976. At the same time, the nationalization

of banks and credit expansion for financing loans to capitalist

farmers and industrialists led to heavy deficit financing and an

associated increase in the money supply. (Notes in circulation

increased from 23 billion rupees in 1971-72 to 57 billion

rupees in 1976-77.) The sharp

increase in the money supply during the period of virtual

stagnation was reflected in a sharp rise in the inflation rate. (The

whole sale price index rose from 150 in 1971 to 289 by 1975.) 9

It appears that although nationalization of industries

and credit expansion enabled the PPP to acquire the support of

a section of the urban petit bourgeoisie through the provision

of jobs, licences and loans, the available funds were not

enough to enrich the entire petit bourgeoisie. In fact, the

section of the lower middle class that did not gain from the

PPP suffered an absolute decline in their real incomes owing

to the high inflation rate. It was this frustrated section of the

petit bourgeoisie and the large lumpen proletariat stricken by

inflation, that responded to the call for a street agitation in

March 1977. Although the apparent form of the street

agitation was spontaneous, it was orchestrated and given

political focus at key junctures of the movement. This

organizational and coordinating function was performed by

trained cadres of the Jamaat-i-Islami, allegedly with support

from the U.S. The agitation was, of course, fuelled by the fact

that the PPP was alleged to have rigged elections in a number

of constituencies. The overthrow of the Bhutto regime and the

subsequent hanging of the first popularly-elected Prime

Minister of Pakistan dramatically’ represented the limits of

populism within a state structure dominated by the military

and bureaucracy.

2. The Fragmentation of Civil Society

Each regime that came into power sought to legitimize itself

through an explicit ideology: The Ayub regime propounded

the ideology of modernization and economic development.

The Bhutto regime sought legitimacy in the ideology of

redeeming the poor (Food, Clothing and Shelter for all)

through socialism. It is an index of Zia’s fear of popular

forces, that he initially sought justification of his government

precisely in its temporary character. If anything it was the

ideology of transience (that he was there for only 90 days for

the sole purpose of holding fair elections). It was this fear that

impelled the Zia regime to seek (albeit through a legal

process the physical elimination of the one individual who

could mobilize popular forces. It was the same fear that subsequently induced Zia to rule on the basis of military terror

while propounding a version of Islamic ideology. Draconian

measures of military courts, arbitrary arrests and public lashings

were introduced. Thus the gradual erosion since Independence of

the institutions of civil society, brought the power of the state

into stark confrontation with the people. Earlier in 1971, this

confrontation had been a major factor in the break-up of Pakistan

and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. Now a protracted

period of Martial Law under the Zia regime served to brutalize

and undermine civil society in what remained of Pakistan.

To be Continue . . . .

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